The announcement was big news. The wine press here in the U.S. and around the world has covered this situation very well. I am not a SMWE insider, so I don’t have breaking news to report here, but as someone who studies the U.S. and global wine markets (and as a personal consumer of Washington wine products), I want to contribute some perspective to the situation, which I hope Wine Economist readers will find useful.
Washington’s Problem By the Numbers
Washington has about 60,000 acres of producing vineyards today, a number that has grown rapidly in the last decade. SMWE is such a dominant producer in the state that their 40 percent cut in grape purchases will make about 10,000 vineyard acres redundant. Growers are advised to look at the situation strategically and to identify diseased and unproductive vineyards for vine removal. Demand and supply are out of balance. Thoughtfully reducing supply is a necessary short-term action.
This is not only sensible advice, it is also the advice that I hear nearly everywhere in the wine world these days. Jeff Bitter, the President of Allied Grape Growers in California, has been telling our State of the Industry audience at the Unified Wine & Grape Symposium this very thing for several years. It isn’t just that Washington has too many grapes, it is a California and global problem, too. I know of a few regions around the world where grapes are in short supply, but the list isn’t very long.
So the Washington situation isn’t unique, but its impact gets attention because of SMWE’s size relative to the Washington industry. Where other regions have suffered from grape cuts by dozens or even hundreds of smaller producers, the spotlight is focused clearly on Washington’s big producer. The big cut makes the news more clearly than many smaller cuts even if the net effect may be much the same.
That said, the proportion of vineyards that will be directly affected by cuts in Washington is higher than in California. This is partly the case because Washington was planting new vineyards while many growers in California were pulling them out. That explains a lot of the problem but not all of it.
The Curse of the Signature Wine
The success of Sauvignon Blanc from New Zealand and Malbec from Argentina has made many people believers in the “Signature Wine” phenomenon. You need to have one signature wine to define a wine-growing region, the story goes. I have always seen Signature Wine as both a blessing and a curse. It is a blessing because it makes a region easier to understand and to sell. But it is a curse because, in my experience, the monolithic identity makes it harder to sell other wines from the region. I have had some great Syrah and Riesling from New Zealand, for example, but these wines don’t get much love because everyone is thinking Sauvignon, Sauvignon, Sauvignon.
Ditto for Argentina, where the Syrah, Cabernet Franc, and Pinot Noir can be wonderful and the Semillion will surprise you. But the market chant is Malbec, Malbec, Malbec. Listen. You can hear it now! And that’s despite the fact that some winemakers think their Cabernet Sauvignon is a better wine.
Students of economics may recognize this as a sort of cockeyed variation on the foreign exchange theory of the “Dutch Disease,” where great success in one industry can backfire in terms of its negative impact on other industries.
I saw the Signature Wine blessing in person when we visited New York City a few years ago. A tour of notable wine shops found lots and lots of wines from Oregon and very few from Washington. Why? Customers who came looking for Oregon wines wanted one thing: Pinot Noir. So the shops made sure to have a large selection. But Washington wine isn’t dominated by one grape variety. There are lots of great wines, but no defining grape variety theme. And so no clear guidelines as to what consumers might expect.
Washington’s Signature Price Point
Actually, that last statement is not quite correct, and maybe this is the important point. Whereas Oregon is Pinot Noir (and Napa is Cabernet Sauvignon), Washington’s Signature Wine isn’t defined by a grape variety so much as a price point. I don’t think it was intentional. Washington has always made lots of different wines from lots of different grape varieties at lots of different price points. But SMWE, the state’s dominant producer, and some other volume producers, too, eventually discovered success by producing large quantities of wines in the $9 to $11 price range at a time when that was the sweet spot of the market. Bulls-eye!
SMWE has many wine brands from Washington state, how did it (and the state) end up being stereotyped to one spot on the wine wall? It is too big a question to be analyzed here. I admit that as a consumer, I sometimes struggled to figure out the relationship between big-volume brands like Chateau Ste. Michelle, Columbia Crest, and 14 Hands. It seems like the power of market growth in that critical price range was like the firm pull of gravity. Hard to resist. But I am sure there was more to it than that.
As premiumization has driven the market sweet spot higher, SMWE’s advantage has melted away enough to create a crisis. That signature price point is still important, but it can’t absorb all the grapes that were planted in anticipation of its continued growth.
Realignment is necessary, but it won’t be as simple as raising price or creating new brands (or designing new labels as I have seen on store shelves). That signature thing will be harder to reset because it is easy to change how you represent your brand, but hard to control how others will perceive it (a variation on a Machiavelli lesson).
Washington is now in a new era, where identity will come from the bottom up through the work of the many successful small- and medium-sized wine producers. It is a big challenge, but the quality is there and so is the determination.
A California Thought Experiment
Here is a little thought experiment that might put the Washington situation in context. What would it mean if California’s largest wine business, Gallo, were to cut grape purchases by 40 percent the way the SMWE did in Washington? I put this question to Natalie Collins, President of the California Association of Wine Grape Growers, and Jeff Bitter, President of Allied Grape Growers. Here is my analysis (all errors are mine, not theirs) based on our conversations.
Gallo buys about one-quarter of California’s wine grapes (a much smaller proportion than SMWE in Washington, although that could be where things end up). That would amount to about 1 million tons of wine grapes in a fairly typical 4 million ton year. A 40 percent cut would mean 400,000 fewer tons of grapes and so, figuring maybe 12 tons per acre, that’s more or less 35 thousand acres of surplus vineyards. If all those vineyards stayed in production, that would be a huge surplus of grapes that would drag down grape prices in some market segments.
The hypothetical Gallo cuts wouldn’t impact all parts of the wine grape market equally, of course. Given recent market trends you might expect vineyards in the interior to be disproportionately affected, although high-quality grapes might find a home in some California blends, replacing more expensive grapes from other regions as the cost squeeze continues to bite.
Bottom line for this thought experiment: a 40 percent cut by the state’s biggest wine grape buyer would have a greater absolute impact in California, as you would expect, but SMWE’s cuts are a larger relative problem in Washington
Something to Think About
Do I expect Gallo to cut grape purchases by 40 percent? No. This is just a hypothetical exercise to stimulate thought.
But Gallo’s huge portfolio is subject to the same general market forces as other producers, so some quantity adjustments are necessary. And Gallo might even become a seller of wine grapes in some market segments if they can’t find a use for all the grapes on the 20,000 acres of vineyards that they control.
Gallo selling grapes? Now that’s really something to think about.